Subject: Hammer and Sickle Date: Tue, 28 Aug 2001 22:22:57 +0100 From: "Ross Hopkins" Newsgroups: soc.history.what-if What if, from the sixties onwards, the Cold War started turning Moscow's way? What if France turned outrightly hostile towards the US, declared it public enemy number one, almost declare war on it, and split the free world down the middle, while China and Russia remained no more than mildly annoyed with each other? What if Russia got involved in a major police action abroad in the sixties and seventies that it had to pull out of, pushing perilously close to civil unrest along the way, along with major crises within it's leadership, only emerging with lessons learnt and a considerably redone leadership that could stand plenty of scrutiny? What if, from the seventies, the West started sliding into permanent recession resulting from inherent problems in the capitalist system and an increasingly corrupt leadership, while the Soviets were staging something approximating a recovery? What if, in the eighties, a President emerged determined to reverse these problems while a hardliner emerged in the Soviet Union taking several reforms and increasing funding for Marxist revolutions around the world? What if, starting from 1989, American forces adopted a Sinatra doctrine and pulled out of their bases around the world, opening them up to Soviet influence? What if, in 1991, McCarthyite hardliners tried to remove the reformist President in a coup, only to go up against a popular socialist alcoholic and the American people, resulting in the disintegration of the US and their conversion to Communist states? What if, in short, the Soviets won the Cold War? All comments welcome. Subject: Re: Hammer and Sickle Date: 29 Aug 2001 03:55:22 -0700 From: korkhova@umdnj.edu (Adamanteus) Organization: http://groups.google.com/ Newsgroups: soc.history.what-if References: 1 "Ross Hopkins" wrote in message news:<3b8c0b38_1@mk-nntp-1.news.uk.worldonline.com>... > What if, from the sixties onwards, the Cold War started turning Moscow's > way? ... > > What if, in short, the Soviets won the Cold War? > > All comments welcome. It's nearly impossible. Communism is bound to end in economic failure eventually. Even if the US doesn't practice containment, the USSR's collapse is simply delayed by another 5-10 years. Subject: Re: Hammer and Sickle Date: 29 Aug 2001 06:26:30 -0700 From: rtrouton@yahoo.com (Rich Trouton) Organization: http://groups.google.com/ Newsgroups: soc.history.what-if References: 1 , 2 korkhova@umdnj.edu (Adamanteus) wrote in message news:... > "Ross Hopkins" wrote in message news:<3b8c0b38_1@mk-nntp-1.news.uk.worldonline.com>... > > What if, from the sixties onwards, the Cold War started turning Moscow's > > way? > > ... > > > > > What if, in short, the Soviets won the Cold War? > > > > All comments welcome. > > It's nearly impossible. Communism is bound to end in economic failure > eventually. Even if the US doesn't practice containment, the USSR's > collapse is simply delayed by another 5-10 years. I don't buy that. The Soviet Union's vast mineral wealth meant it could still make money without necessarily being efficient in other areas. One thing the Russians are good at is mining raw material, and they've got large reserves in gold, oil, and natural gas. If the Soviets had managed to last until the Gulf War (when I say Gulf War, I mean the war resulting from Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in 1991) without the disruption that Gorbachev and his attempted reforms caused, there still might be a Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact today. Why? Because Hussein might have been more successful in a TL where Cold War tensions meant that there was the possibility that the Gulf War *might* lead to a superpower showdown. Hence, the US might have been more cautious in building and leading a coalition to toss the Iraqis out of Kuwait. This more than probably would have lead to rising oil prices and a recession in the West, both of which the Soviets could have profited from economically and politically. In short, if the USSR had stayed with Brezhnev-style leadership through the 80's and 90's, it could still be lumbering along today. Rich "Ain't that a scary thought?" Subject: Re: Hammer and Sickle Date: 30 Aug 2001 17:19:02 -0700 From: korkhova@umdnj.edu (Adamanteus) Organization: http://groups.google.com/ Newsgroups: soc.history.what-if References: 1 , 2 , 3 rtrouton@yahoo.com (Rich Trouton) wrote in message news:... > korkhova@umdnj.edu (Adamanteus) wrote in message news:... > > > What if, in short, the Soviets won the Cold War? > > > > > > All comments welcome. > > > > It's nearly impossible. Communism is bound to end in economic failure > > eventually. Even if the US doesn't practice containment, the USSR's > > collapse is simply delayed by another 5-10 years. > > I don't buy that. The Soviet Union's vast mineral wealth meant it > could still make money without necessarily being efficient in other > areas. One thing the Russians are good at is mining raw material, and > they've got large reserves in gold, oil, and natural gas. If the > Soviets had managed to last until the Gulf War (when I say Gulf War, I > mean the war resulting from Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in > 1991) without the disruption that Gorbachev and his attempted reforms > caused, there still might be a Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact today. > Why? Because Hussein might have been more successful in a TL where > Cold War tensions meant that there was the possibility that the Gulf > War *might* lead to a superpower showdown. Hence, the US might have > been more cautious in building and leading a coalition to toss the > Iraqis out of Kuwait. This more than probably would have lead to > rising oil prices and a recession in the West, both of which the > Soviets could have profited from economically and politically. In > short, if the USSR had stayed with Brezhnev-style leadership through > the 80's and 90's, it could still be lumbering along today. Ok. One could imagine that a Stalin-like aggressive Soviet leader would emerge, say around 1964, that would pursue an aggressive course of exploiting the USSR's resources. As it was, the USSR was so inefficient that it could not even harvest its resources effectively. I think it would take a leader with more vision than Brezhnev, who was rather conservative. If that happens, the USSR is able to carry on economically into the 21st century. It causes the arms race to continue and escalate, and the Gulf War show-down only adds to it. The Arab nations will ally with the Soviets in the controversy, which may ultimately cause an oil shortage in the West, and recession, as you said. I doubt this will lead to victory for the Soviets, though. For a long time, perhaps as long as 50 years, the Eastern alliance will have the upper hand. However, I suspect it will divert attention to research in non-petroleum based energy sources, perhaps--dare I say it?--fusion. The reason I say this is because there's a limited supply of oil in the world, which is not expected to be enough to supply beyond the middle of the 21st century. This is a competition which I doubt the Soviets will win. Subject: Re: Hammer and Sickle Date: Fri, 31 Aug 2001 16:34:02 -0400 From: Rich Trouton Newsgroups: soc.history.what-if References: 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 In article , korkhova@umdnj.edu (Adamanteus) wrote: > rtrouton@yahoo.com (Rich Trouton) wrote in message > news:... > > korkhova@umdnj.edu (Adamanteus) wrote in message > > news:... > > > > > What if, in short, the Soviets won the Cold War? > > > > > > > > All comments welcome. > > > > > > It's nearly impossible. Communism is bound to end in economic > > > failure > > > eventually. Even if the US doesn't practice containment, the USSR's > > > collapse is simply delayed by another 5-10 years. > > > > I don't buy that. The Soviet Union's vast mineral wealth meant it > > could still make money without necessarily being efficient in other > > areas. One thing the Russians are good at is mining raw material, and > > they've got large reserves in gold, oil, and natural gas. If the > > Soviets had managed to last until the Gulf War (when I say Gulf War, I > > mean the war resulting from Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in > > 1991) without the disruption that Gorbachev and his attempted reforms > > caused, there still might be a Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact today. > > Why? Because Hussein might have been more successful in a TL where > > Cold War tensions meant that there was the possibility that the Gulf > > War *might* lead to a superpower showdown. Hence, the US might have > > been more cautious in building and leading a coalition to toss the > > Iraqis out of Kuwait. This more than probably would have lead to > > rising oil prices and a recession in the West, both of which the > > Soviets could have profited from economically and politically. In > > short, if the USSR had stayed with Brezhnev-style leadership through > > the 80's and 90's, it could still be lumbering along today. > > Ok. > > One could imagine that a Stalin-like aggressive Soviet leader would > emerge, say around 1964, that would pursue an aggressive course of > exploiting the USSR's resources. As it was, the USSR was so > inefficient that it could not even harvest its resources effectively. > I think it would take a leader with more vision than Brezhnev, who was > rather conservative. Mikhail Gorbachev's memoirs contain a great passage on how well the Soviet Union was able to exploit its resources: "The costs of labor, fuel, raw material per unit of production were two to two-and-a-half times higher than in the developed countries, while in agriculture they were ten times higher. We produced more coal, oil, metals, cement, and other materials (except synthetics) than the United States, but our end product was less than half of the U.S.A." Moverover, after the collapse of the Soviet Union Russian industries were found to be hoarding immense stockpiles of raw materials, perhaps as much as $700 billion dollars worth according to some estimates. This massive stockpiling was part of the reason why the Soviet Union had chronic shortages; sometimes the materials were extracted, but not released to industry for use. The reason for the senseless stockpiles was that, in the event of nuclear war (a war the Soviets would presumably win), the now Socialist world would be able to rebuild. Industrial managers went along with this scheme so that they could use these heaps and piles of superflous stuff in black-market bartering for what their own industries actually needed. In other words, they had harvesting down pat. It was actual utilization that they were having a problem with. In the scenario I outlined above, they don't need to utilize them, just export them in exchange for hard currency. This makes the Soviet Union wealthier to subsidize their own badly-run industires and equip them with more Western technology. It also makes the West more economically dependent on them. > > If that happens, the USSR is able to carry on economically into the > 21st century. It causes the arms race to continue and escalate, and > the Gulf War show-down only adds to it. The Arab nations will ally > with the Soviets in the controversy, which may ultimately cause an oil > shortage in the West, and recession, as you said. I doubt this will > lead to victory for the Soviets, though. For a long time, perhaps as > long as 50 years, the Eastern alliance will have the upper hand. > However, I suspect it will divert attention to research in > non-petroleum based energy sources, perhaps--dare I say it?--fusion. > The reason I say this is because there's a limited supply of oil in > the world, which is not expected to be enough to supply beyond the > middle of the 21st century. This is a competition which I doubt the > Soviets will win. If the West is going to divert resources to developing non-petroleum based energy sources, then the Soviet Union's going to be developing them right along with them, mainly with information stolen by the KGB. Keep in mind how the Soviets were able to keep up with the US in the military sector. The Soviet Union was practically a Third World nation with a First World military. They kept up in the arms race with technology stolen from the Americans. Also, the Soviet Union had *never* been a slouch when it came to the physical sciences. After the Cold War ended, a lot of Russian physicists came to the West to join the faculty of (among others) the University of Minnesota. If the Politburo decides that they *must* have fusion, and are able to get S&T from the West's research and development efforts, you can be pretty sure that the Soviets will be able to develop nuclear fusion around the same time or slightly after that the West develops it. Rich Subject: Re: Hammer and Sickle Date: Sat, 01 Sep 2001 11:39:14 GMT From: Monte Davis Newsgroups: soc.history.what-if References: 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 Rich Trouton wrote: >The Soviet Union was practically a Third World nation >with a First World military. They kept up in the arms race with >technology stolen from the Americans. Also, the Soviet Union had *never* >been a slouch when it came to the physical sciences... Agreed with the first and third sentences, but I think espionage played a relatively small part overall in Cold War Soviet military technology. While the "missile gap" was US partisan flimflam, their booster designs were home-grown (i.e., no more dependent on Germans than ours). And their first thermonuclear device was considerably closer to a deliverable weapon than ours. -Monte "who'd steal the 'Mike' design?" Davis Subject: Re: Hammer and Sickle Date: 1 Sep 2001 15:18:17 GMT From: cgrussel@bradford.ac.uk (CG RUSSELL) Newsgroups: soc.history.what-if References: 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 Monte Davis (modavis@bellatlantic.net) wrote: : Rich Trouton wrote: : >The Soviet Union was practically a Third World nation : >with a First World military. They kept up in the arms race with : >technology stolen from the Americans. Also, the Soviet Union had *never* : >been a slouch when it came to the physical sciences... : Agreed with the first and third sentences, but I think espionage : played a relatively small part overall in Cold War Soviet military : technology. While the "missile gap" was US partisan flimflam, their : booster designs were home-grown (i.e., no more dependent on Germans : than ours). And their first thermonuclear device was considerably : closer to a deliverable weapon than ours. Their first H-bomb was dropped from a plane in the same year as the first US detonation of a warehouse sized H-bomb. -- Chris | Russell's | Five | Bradford, Bradford, (so good I said it twice) Line | Sig | Subject: Re: Hammer and Sickle Date: 1 Sep 2001 13:00:11 -0700 From: marathag@yahoo.com (mike) Organization: http://groups.google.com/ Newsgroups: soc.history.what-if References: 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 cgrussel@bradford.ac.uk (CG RUSSELL) wrote in message news:<3b90ee29$1@chlorine.cen.brad.ac.uk>... > Monte Davis (modavis@bellatlantic.net) wrote: > : Agreed with the first and third sentences, but I think espionage > : played a relatively small part overall in Cold War Soviet military > : technology. The Soviets were caught unaware by the Ivy Mike Device, and were unsure how such a lage explosion could have been done so soon in Oct '52. The Alarm Clock/LayerCake method they were developing could not be increased to that kind of Yield, and was very inefficient in use of the nuclear material: This is Why Teller&Ulam moved onto the Dry Staged method. US designers saw the Alarm Clock as a "Dead End"(as was Mike) made only a few bombs of this style. Ivy Mike was important as it used radiation, rather than just whopping huge chunks of HE to get the fusion reaction going. However,Do not underestimate the amount of info gathered by Soviets Spies and Western Traitors during the ColdWar. > :While the "missile gap" was US partisan flimflam, their > : booster designs were home-grown (i.e., no more dependent on Germans > : than ours). There has been rethinking on that now that Soviet era records are more accessible, with the Germans being *much* more important than realized http://www.friends-partners.org/partners/mwade/lvfam/earsiles.htm It was much more uneven in the USA, with seperate Army/Navy/USAF programs, with each having different ideas on how much to use the Germans, with the Army Whole Hog for it with the Redstone, while almost none with Convairs ICBM work that led to Atlas. Check the family resemblance between the Armys Redstone and the Soviets SS-3 Shyster/R5M. Not twins, but you can tell they had the same daddy. > : And their first thermonuclear device was considerably > : closer to a deliverable weapon than ours. > > Their first H-bomb was dropped from a plane in the same year as the first US > detonation of a warehouse sized H-bomb. The Soviets were never ahead of the US in deploying any type of thermonuclear weapon. The Mk 14 H-bomb was in service in Feb '54 The First Soviet H-Bomb (RDS-6, AKA Joe 4)designed by Sakharov using the LayerCake layout was *NOT* a deployable, fully weaponized bomb, but a device exploded from a Tower at Semipalatinsk on Aug 12 '53. Making it air droppable would have added 6+ months to development. [Dark Sun,pg 523] Besides, Joe-4 had a Yield of 'only'3-400 kt, The US had been doing Tritium/Deuterium 'Boosted Fission' bombs since Shot George of Operation Greenhouse in May '51 (225 kt.) and _big_ Fission bombs like the Ivy King Shot in Nov '52(500kt), a converted Mk 6 bomb which became the deployed Mk18 in March '53 ** mike ** Subject: Re: Hammer and Sickle Date: Sat, 01 Sep 2001 15:50:45 GMT From: Rich Trouton Newsgroups: soc.history.what-if References: 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 In article <8ph1pt0uoo51gmgeglevkqf4lfhn06dglf@4ax.com>, modavis@bellatlantic.net wrote: > Rich Trouton wrote: > > >The Soviet Union was practically a Third World nation > >with a First World military. They kept up in the arms race with > >technology stolen from the Americans. Also, the Soviet Union had *never* > >been a slouch when it came to the physical sciences... > > Agreed with the first and third sentences, but I think espionage > played a relatively small part overall in Cold War Soviet military > technology. While the "missile gap" was US partisan flimflam, their > booster designs were home-grown (i.e., no more dependent on Germans > than ours). And their first thermonuclear device was considerably > closer to a deliverable weapon than ours. > Directorate T of the KGB ran extensive science and technology (S&T) aquisition operations in the West. Two examples cited in Vasili Mitrokhin's book "The Sword and the Shield" were: 1. Directorate T's exhibit at the Chekist Hall of Fame in 1977 claimed that in the previous five year period it had obtained over 140,000 S&T documents and more than 20,000 "samples". These were alleged to have produced an economic benefit of over 1 billion rubles and to have advanced research in a number of S&T branches by periods of two to six years. These included top secret information on the Saturn rocket, the Apollo space mission, the Poseidon, Honest John, Redeye, Roland, Hydra and Viper missiles, the Boeing 747 and IBM computer technology subsequently plagerized in the construction of the Minsk-32 computer. ("Sword and Shield", page 216) 2. According to an official US report, "The Soviets estimate that by using documentation on the US F-18 fighter their aviation and radar industries saved some five years of development time and 35 million roubles (the 1980 dollar cost of equivalent research activity would be $55 million) in project manpower and other developmental costs. The manpower portion of these savings probably represents over a thousand man-years of scientific research effort and one of the most successful individual exploitations of Western technolgy." "The documentation of the F-18 fire-control radar served as the technical basis for new lookdown/shootdown engagement radars for the latest generation of Soviet fighters. US methods of component design, fast-Fourier-transform algorithms, terrain mapping functions, and real-time resolution-enhancement techniques were cited as key elements incorporated into the Soviet counterpart."("Sword and Shield", page 218) Additionally, other successful military and civilian projects made possible by KGB S&T aquisition included the construction of a Soviet clone of the AWACS airborne radar system, the Buran shuttle orbiter, and the Blackjack bomber which was modeled on the American B-1B bomber. However, the most famous example of Soviet S&T espionage is still the theft of nuclear secrets from the Manhatten Project, which sliced years off of the Soviet development and deployment of nuclear weapons. Rich Subject: Re: Hammer and Sickle Date: 01 Sep 2001 17:25:20 GMT From: coyu@aol.com (Coyu) Organization: AOL http://www.aol.com Newsgroups: soc.history.what-if References: 1 Rich Trouton wrote: >Directorate T of the KGB ran extensive science and technology (S&T) >aquisition operations in the West. Two examples cited in Vasili >Mitrokhin's book "The Sword and the Shield" Um. There are a lot of problems with Mitrokhin's book (actually much more Christopher Andrew's). I wouldn't assert anything from it without some other piece of confirmatory material. This is not to say the Sovs did not make vast attempts at ripping off Western R&D. They did. Subject: Re: Hammer and Sickle Date: Sat, 01 Sep 2001 13:54:26 -0400 From: Rich Trouton Newsgroups: soc.history.what-if References: 1 , 2 In article <20010901132520.18566.00002018@mb-fk.aol.com>, coyu@aol.com (Coyu) wrote: > Rich Trouton wrote: > > >Directorate T of the KGB ran extensive science and technology (S&T) > >aquisition operations in the West. Two examples cited in Vasili > >Mitrokhin's book "The Sword and the Shield" > > Um. There are a lot of problems with Mitrokhin's book (actually > much more Christopher Andrew's). I wouldn't assert anything > from it without some other piece of confirmatory material. > > This is not to say the Sovs did not make vast attempts at ripping off > Western R&D. They did. > > I hadn't heard of anyone (besides the SVR) denouncing "The Sword and Shield" as inaccurate. Can you provide a source showing where the book is wrong? While it doesn't corroborate these details, "The Falcon and the Snowman" chronicles the story of how the KGB stole classified information from TRW via Andrew Daulton Lee and his friend, TRW employee Christopher Boyce. There's also John Barron's work from the 70's "KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents" which includes details of various S&T operations started under Khruschev. Ultimately, that's beside the point. The point under contention was whether or not the Soviets stole technology from the West. They did, and it showed most visibly in Soviet aircraft during the last stages of the Cold War, where the Blackjack looked like the B-1B bomber and the Buran orbiter looked like a carbon copy of the US Space Shuttle. Rich Subject: Re: Hammer and Sickle Date: 01 Sep 2001 19:20:32 GMT From: coyu@aol.com (Coyu) Organization: AOL http://www.aol.com Newsgroups: soc.history.what-if References: 1 Rich Trouton wrote: >> >Directorate T of the KGB ran extensive science and technology (S&T) >> >aquisition operations in the West. Two examples cited in Vasili >> >Mitrokhin's book "The Sword and the Shield" >> >> Um. There are a lot of problems with Mitrokhin's book (actually >> much more Christopher Andrew's). I wouldn't assert anything >> from it without some other piece of confirmatory material. >> >> This is not to say the Sovs did not make vast attempts at ripping off >> Western R&D. They did. >> >> > >I hadn't heard of anyone (besides the SVR) denouncing "The Sword and >Shield" as inaccurate. Can you provide a source showing where the book >is wrong? There was a big flap about it in the UK when it was released, to the effect that British intelligence had spun the book to the River Kwai and back, for specific domestic political reasons. So. Not inaccurate per se, but deeply flawed. Thus the need for corroborating sources. Subject: Re: Hammer and Sickle Date: Mon, 03 Sep 2001 12:11:49 GMT From: mbusse@midway.uchicago.edu (Marty Busse) Organization: Com Ed Bites like a Great White Shark Newsgroups: soc.history.what-if References: 1 , 2 In article <20010901152032.00764.00004329@mb-mm.aol.com>, Coyu wrote: >Rich Trouton wrote: > >>> >Directorate T of the KGB ran extensive science and technology (S&T) >>> >aquisition operations in the West. Two examples cited in Vasili >>> >Mitrokhin's book "The Sword and the Shield" >>> >>> Um. There are a lot of problems with Mitrokhin's book (actually >>> much more Christopher Andrew's). I wouldn't assert anything >>> from it without some other piece of confirmatory material. >>> >>> This is not to say the Sovs did not make vast attempts at ripping off >>> Western R&D. They did. >>> >>> >> >>I hadn't heard of anyone (besides the SVR) denouncing "The Sword and >>Shield" as inaccurate. Can you provide a source showing where the book >>is wrong? > >There was a big flap about it in the UK when it was released, >to the effect that British intelligence had spun the book to the River >Kwai and back, for specific domestic political reasons. > Presumably there was some evidence that this was the case, yes? If so, feel free to point us to it. >So. Not inaccurate per se, but deeply flawed. Thus the need for >corroborating sources. > And there are more than enough of them to show that the Soviets were engaged in massive thefts of Western technology. -- "Romance without finance is a nuisance."-Petey Wheatstraw Subject: Re: Hammer and Sickle Date: 03 Sep 2001 15:39:55 GMT From: coyu@aol.com (Coyu) Organization: AOL http://www.aol.com Newsgroups: soc.history.what-if References: 1 Marty Busse wrote: >>There was a big flap about it in the UK when it was released, >>to the effect that British intelligence had spun the book to the River >>Kwai and back, for specific domestic political reasons. >> > >Presumably there was some evidence that this was the case, yes? If >so, feel free to point us to it. Sure: http://www.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm47/4764/4764-03.htm#gen11 "55. The Committee views the events that took place in 1999 as confused and it is of the opinion that officials failed to provide Ministers with the necessary support and advice. When the final submission was sent to the Foreign Secretary on 22 March 1999, it stated that the ''Security Service are clearing the detail contained in those chapters [on the UK] with the Home Secretary (who was briefed on the project in 1998, and is supportive) and the Attorney General.'' This was not accurate. [emphasis in bold] No one was clearing the UK chapters with the Home Secretary, who had only noted the publication project in December 1998, and the Attorney General had only been consulted on the detail of one case at the time the submission went to the Foreign Secretary." To be sure, the inquiry concluded that ignorance and ineptitude, especially with regards to media relations, were to blame. But keep in mind the information about Norwood was only released _after_ a documentary producer figured it out, based on the material he was allowed to see. >>So. Not inaccurate per se, but deeply flawed. Thus the need for >>corroborating sources. >> > > >And there are more than enough of them to show that the Soviets were >engaged in massive thefts of Western technology. Which I said in the part you clipped. Tsk. You know, I don't have to affirm my knowledge that the Soviets were bad mofos every time I post about them; and I get annoyed when people act as though I should. "Sniff, sniff; are you a good anti-Fascist?" Subject: Re: Hammer and Sickle Date: Tue, 04 Sep 2001 10:03:34 GMT From: mbusse@midway.uchicago.edu (Marty Busse) Organization: Com Ed Bites like a Great White Shark Newsgroups: soc.history.what-if References: 1 , 2 In article <20010903113955.23048.00003648@mb-fk.aol.com>, Coyu wrote: >Marty Busse wrote: > >>>There was a big flap about it in the UK when it was released, >>>to the effect that British intelligence had spun the book to the River >>>Kwai and back, for specific domestic political reasons. >>> >> >>Presumably there was some evidence that this was the case, yes? If >>so, feel free to point us to it. > >Sure: > >http://www.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm47/4764/4764-03.htm#gen11 > >"55. The Committee views the events that took place in 1999 as confused >and it is of the opinion that officials failed to provide Ministers with the >necessary support and advice. When the final submission was sent >to the Foreign Secretary on 22 March 1999, it stated that the >''Security Service are clearing the detail contained in those chapters >[on the UK] with the Home Secretary (who was briefed on the project >in 1998, and is supportive) and the Attorney General.'' This was not >accurate. [emphasis in bold] No one was clearing the UK chapters >with the Home Secretary, who had only noted the publication project >in December 1998, and the Attorney General had only been >consulted on the detail of one case at the time the submission went to >the Foreign Secretary." > >To be sure, the inquiry concluded that ignorance and ineptitude, >especially with regards to media relations, were to blame. > >But keep in mind the information about Norwood was only released >_after_ a documentary producer figured it out, based on the material >he was allowed to see. > Which was in keeping with the desire to avoid mentionning the names of anyone who had not been charged with a crime. I read that URL, and didn't find anything suggesting that Mitrokhin's information was not factual. >>>So. Not inaccurate per se, but deeply flawed. Thus the need for >>>corroborating sources. >>> >> >> >>And there are more than enough of them to show that the Soviets were >>engaged in massive thefts of Western technology. > >Which I said in the part you clipped. Tsk. > My error. I apologize. >You know, I don't have to affirm my knowledge that the Soviets >were bad mofos every time I post about them; and I get annoyed when >people act as though I should. "Sniff, sniff; are you a good anti-Fascist?" > > My annoyance was more because you were slamming Mitrokhin's information without good reason. That the Soviets were evil bastards is pretty much self-evident to anyone who's bothered to do even the barest research on them, so it's hardly necessary to mention it. -- http://www.nos.org/htm/basic2.htm Subject: Re: Hammer and Sickle Date: 04 Sep 2001 15:28:29 GMT From: coyu@aol.com (Coyu) Organization: AOL http://www.aol.com Newsgroups: soc.history.what-if References: 1 Marty Busse wrote: [on the Mitrokhin archive] >Which was in keeping with the desire to avoid mentionning the names of >anyone who had not been charged with a crime. Yet they caved when David Rose figured out HOLA == Melita Norwood, and threw that principle to the winds. >I read that URL, and didn't find anything suggesting that Mitrokhin's >information was not factual. Actually, I am more worried about British intelligence's manipulation of the data, for which I think you can find plenty of evidence in the URL. Subject: Re: Hammer and Sickle Date: 01 Sep 2001 21:46:45 +0100 From: John A Lee Newsgroups: soc.history.what-if References: 1 , 2 coyu@aol.com (Coyu) writes: > Rich Trouton wrote: > > >Directorate T of the KGB ran extensive science and technology (S&T) > >aquisition operations in the West. Two examples cited in Vasili > >Mitrokhin's book "The Sword and the Shield" > > Um. There are a lot of problems with Mitrokhin's book (actually > much more Christopher Andrew's). I wouldn't assert anything > from it without some other piece of confirmatory material. A trifle unfair, I think, especially when your later post indicates that your objection appears not to be based on any specific factual grounds. Christopher Andrew has indeed been given privileged access to material, and is not the first reputable historian to have been in that position. The fact remains that he's not some teenage controversialist or frothing revisionist, he's a real historian who has paid his dues. I haven't read the Mitrokhin Archive book yet, but I have read some of Andrew's earlier books, and I've not yet caught him out in any obvious malpractice, which is more than I can say of most people writing books on the subject of intelligence. Of course, just because someone collects technical intelligence, it doesn't necessary follow that it ever gets used to good purpose. There are plenty of historical precedents to that effect. People involved in intelligence operations are usually technical ignoramuses. Disclaimer: I knew Christopher Andrew when I was at university some decades ago. Subject: Re: Hammer and Sickle Date: 01 Sep 2001 22:22:13 GMT From: coyu@aol.com (Coyu) Organization: AOL http://www.aol.com Newsgroups: soc.history.what-if References: 1 John A. Lee wrote: >> Um. There are a lot of problems with Mitrokhin's book (actually >> much more Christopher Andrew's). I wouldn't assert anything >> from it without some other piece of confirmatory material. > > >A trifle unfair, I think, especially when your later post indicates >that your objection appears not to be based on any specific factual >grounds. When I first read it, there were a number of items that raised, um, red flags in my mind -- this resulted me in not buying the book, so I don't have a ready list of what I found off. Much of it, though, struck me as very massaged data. Mitrokhin's scraps, processed by the MI folks, given to Andrew in digest form, then filled in with info from Andrew's earlier books. There was one dodgy assertion I remember specifically -- the rumors about J. Edgar Hoover's homosexuality were said to be a KGB tactic. Um. In actuality, they seem to have been around since Hoover brought Clyde Tolson to the FBI, in the late twenties. >Christopher Andrew has indeed been given privileged access to >material, and is not the first reputable historian to have been in >that position. The fact remains that he's not some teenage >controversialist or frothing revisionist, he's a real historian who >has paid his dues. I haven't read the Mitrokhin Archive book yet, but >I have read some of Andrew's earlier books, and I've not yet caught >him out in any obvious malpractice, which is more than I can say of >most people writing books on the subject of intelligence. Sure. Far better than "Viktor Suvorov", or Bob Woodward's William Casey stuff. But this makes it even more troubling, IMO. I hope the promised second volume clears up these defects. >Disclaimer: I knew Christopher Andrew when I was at university some >decades ago. Subject: Re: Hammer and Sickle Date: Mon, 03 Sep 2001 12:32:14 GMT From: mbusse@midway.uchicago.edu (Marty Busse) Organization: Com Ed Bites like a Great White Shark Newsgroups: soc.history.what-if References: 1 , 2 In article <20010901182213.02116.00006930@ng-bd1.aol.com>, Coyu wrote: >John A. Lee wrote: > >>> Um. There are a lot of problems with Mitrokhin's book (actually >>> much more Christopher Andrew's). I wouldn't assert anything >>> from it without some other piece of confirmatory material. >> >> >>A trifle unfair, I think, especially when your later post indicates >>that your objection appears not to be based on any specific factual >>grounds. > >When I first read it, there were a number of items that raised, um, red >flags in my mind -- this resulted me in not buying the book, so I don't >have a ready list of what I found off. > >Much of it, though, struck me as very massaged data. Mitrokhin's >scraps, processed by the MI folks, given to Andrew in digest form, >then filled in with info from Andrew's earlier books. > This isn't exactly damning evidence against the book. >There was one dodgy assertion I remember specifically -- the rumors >about J. Edgar Hoover's homosexuality were said to be a KGB >tactic. Um. In actuality, they seem to have been around since Hoover >brought Clyde Tolson to the FBI, in the late twenties. > What he said was that the KGB encouraged those rumors. (which may not go back to the 1920s, but certainly go back to the 1940s: see http://www.thesmokinggun.com/archive/hoover1.html) The whole "J. Edgar Hoover was gay" meme is *extremely* dubious: there are only two people who have ever commented on having hard evidence that he was. One is his psychiatrist's wife, who says Hoover admitted it to her husband in a session: the shrink is dead, of course, and can neither corrobate or refute her. (http://www.salon.com/health/sex/urge/world/2000/01/05/hoover/ has a mention of her, as well as some arguments about this) The other "witness" is a known perjurer who spent a lot of time suing J. Edgar Hoover when he was alive because the FBI was, according to her, persecuting her husband, who spent a lot of his time in jail due to his occupation as a mobster. All the witnesses who could confirm of refute her story are dead, too. Nonetheless, the national news media threw the story all over the place, and now "J. Edgar Hoover was gay" is popular dogma. >>Christopher Andrew has indeed been given privileged access to >>material, and is not the first reputable historian to have been in >>that position. The fact remains that he's not some teenage >>controversialist or frothing revisionist, he's a real historian who >>has paid his dues. I haven't read the Mitrokhin Archive book yet, but >>I have read some of Andrew's earlier books, and I've not yet caught >>him out in any obvious malpractice, which is more than I can say of >>most people writing books on the subject of intelligence. > >Sure. Far better than "Viktor Suvorov", or Bob Woodward's William >Casey stuff. But this makes it even more troubling, IMO. > So, he doesn't have glaringly obvious mistakes, and this makes it worse somehow? We won't go into all the things he wrote about that have been proven blazingly correct...like all the spies he exposed. (The odious liar Melita Norwood comes to mind here.) So far, you have not provided any good reasons for anyone to doubt what Mitrokhin wrote. >I hope the promised second volume clears up these defects. > Aside from your vague unease, you haven't really given any reason to doubt his information. -- "Romance without finance is a nuisance."-Petey Wheatstraw Subject: Re: Hammer and Sickle Date: 03 Sep 2001 15:43:22 GMT From: coyu@aol.com (Coyu) Organization: AOL http://www.aol.com Newsgroups: soc.history.what-if References: 1 Marty Busse wrote: >We won't go into all the things he wrote about that have been proven >blazingly correct...like all the spies he exposed. (The odious liar >Melita Norwood comes to mind here.) Norwood was revealed in Venona, and had been on the short list of probables for ages. Subject: Re: Hammer and Sickle Date: Mon, 03 Sep 2001 17:33:44 GMT From: dtenner@ameritech.net (David Tenner) Organization: Prodigy Internet http://www.prodigy.com Newsgroups: soc.history.what-if References: 1 , 2 , 3 Marty Busse wrote in : > >So far, you have not provided any good reasons for anyone to doubt >what Mitrokhin wrote. Amy Knight has argued that Mitrokhin may not have been a genuine defector: "Last year's 'Sword and the Shield,' by contrast, is billed as something different. Co-author Christopher Andrew tells us that the sources were gathered by a defector, Vasili Mitrokhin, not a representative of the FIS, which means that they are more trustworthy. This in itself is a questionable premise, but even more problematic is the story of Mitrokhin's defection, which strains credulity. Mitrokhin, Andrew tells us, was a secret dissident who strongly disapproved of the KGB even though he worked for its foreign intelligence branch for 35 years. In 1972, for some inexplicable reason, Mitrokhin, who never achieved a rank above major in his entire KGB career, was given the sensitive job of overseeing the transfer of the KGB's entire foreign intelligence archive to its new headquarters outside Moscow. According to Andrew, Mitrokhin had two private offices and unlimited access to the KGB's darkest secrets. With the goal of getting back at his employers by telling the West about the KGB's foreign operations, Mitrokhin spent the next 12 years scribbling thousands upon thousands of notes from the files he saw. Incredibly, given the rigorous security rules in all Soviet archives, no one noticed what Mitrokhin was doing all day or checked him when he was going home at night. "The story gets even more mysterious. Despite all his hard work, Mitrokhin made no attempt to do anything with the notes he took (except to retype them) after his retirement in 1984. His private 'archive' would apparently never have seen the light of day if it had not been for the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Emboldened to take action, Mitrokhin traveled to an unnamed Baltic country in 1992 and knocked on the door of a British embassy. After a few more trips back and forth to Russia, he eventually was 'exfiltrated' by the British with all his documents (six suitcases' worth) and his family. All this happened under the very noses of the members of the Russian security services, who apparently did not notice that one of their former colleagues who had had access to top-secret files was going back and forth to one of the now-independent Baltic states (where the Russians were spying up a storm). "Despite the strange circumstances surrounding the Mitrokhin story, which suggest that he had some help from his former employers in assembling his notes, Andrew considers his book to be more reliable than the other collaborative spy histories: 'Their main weakness, for which the authors cannot be blamed, is that the choice of KGB documents on which they are based has been made not by them but by the SVR [the Russian acronym for the FIS].' Yet even if we accept that Mitrokhin was a genuine defector who did copy all the notes by himself, Andrew's effort to distinguish his book from the others falls a bit flat. In this case, too, someone other than the author selected the materials, and that someone used to work for the KGB. "While 'The Sword and the Shield' contains new information, including the revelation that a British woman named Melita Norwood, now in her eighties, spied for the Soviets several decades ago, none of it has much significance for broader interpretations of the Cold War. The main message the reader comes away with after plowing through almost a thousand pages is the same one gleaned from the earlier books: the Soviets were incredibly successful, albeit evil, spymasters, and none of the Western services could come close to matching their expertise. Bravo the KGB." http://homepages.nyu.edu/~th15/knight.html (Yes, I know the fact that Knight's article appeared on a pro-Hiss web site may set off alarm bells; but after all, they only reprinted it; it was originally in the Wilson Quarterly.) For a counter-argument to Knight, see http://cicentre.com/BOOKS_Redmond_Mitrokhin.htm "Amy Knight in the Times Literary Supplement ('Who Selected the Mitrokhin Archive?') wonders whether the KGB helped Mitrokhin compile the data. She raises all sorts of questions of how he got and maintained access, why he waited so long to get the information out, and how he had time to make all the notes. These issues can only be described as 'ivory tower,' and bespeak an isolated, academic mindset which fails to take into account human nature and drive, chance, bureaucratic vagaries, and the high competence of an intelligence service, in this case MI-6...Ms. Knight’s suggestion that the data was sent by the KGB is, indeed, farfetched." And of course, even if the FIS *was* behind the book, that doesn't make the book inaccurate; it certainly has been proven accurate in the case of Norwood. But there are doubtless things in the book which can neither be corroborated nor refuted. And in deciding whether we should believe them, the question of who was behind the book seems to me quite relevant. -- David Tenner dtenner@ameritech.net Subject: Re: Hammer and Sickle Date: Tue, 04 Sep 2001 10:11:50 GMT From: mbusse@midway.uchicago.edu (Marty Busse) Organization: Com Ed Bites like a Great White Shark Newsgroups: soc.history.what-if References: 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 In article <911180C5Adtennerameritechnet@news.chi.sbcglobal.net>, David Tenner wrote: >Marty Busse wrote in >: > > >> >>So far, you have not provided any good reasons for anyone to doubt >>what Mitrokhin wrote. > >Amy Knight has argued that Mitrokhin may not have been a genuine defector: (snip for brevity's sake) > >http://homepages.nyu.edu/~th15/knight.html (Yes, I know the fact that >Knight's article appeared on a pro-Hiss web site may set off alarm bells; but >after all, they only reprinted it; it was originally in the Wilson >Quarterly.) > Amy Knight's credentials on the subject are impeccable: I own her books on the KGB and Beria. (Which are right now packed up preparatory to my move cross-country.) >For a counter-argument to Knight, see >http://cicentre.com/BOOKS_Redmond_Mitrokhin.htm > >"Amy Knight in the Times Literary Supplement ('Who Selected the Mitrokhin >Archive?') wonders whether the KGB helped Mitrokhin compile the data. She >raises all sorts of questions of how he got and maintained access, why he >waited so long to get the information out, and how he had time to make all >the notes. These issues can only be described as 'ivory tower,' and bespeak >an isolated, academic mindset which fails to take into account human nature >and drive, chance, bureaucratic vagaries, and the high competence of an >intelligence service, in this case MI-6...Ms. Knight’s suggestion that the >data was sent by the KGB is, indeed, farfetched." > >And of course, even if the FIS *was* behind the book, that doesn't make the >book inaccurate; it certainly has been proven accurate in the case of >Norwood. But there are doubtless things in the book which can neither be >corroborated nor refuted. And in deciding whether we should believe them, >the question of who was behind the book seems to me quite relevant. > >-- >David Tenner >dtenner@ameritech.net > So, is it the MI types or the FIS who is behind the book? Or maybe the derros or the reticulant greys from Zeta Reticuli? I'm being facetious here, of course. But there's about as much evidence to suggest that the derros or reticulant greys are behind the book as to anyone else. What we do know for sure is that Mitrokhin's evidence has blown the cover of a few spies, revealed some ammunition and weapons dumps left behind by the KGB in case of WWIII, and severly embarassed the spies of the ex-SU. I'm not suggesting that Mitrokhin be taken as the sole source for information on the subject...just that the book is a very good source, and that there is no good reason to doubt any of the information in it. -- http://www.nos.org/htm/basic2.htm Subject: Re: Hammer and Sickle Date: 3 Sep 2001 10:50:43 -0700 From: rtrouton@yahoo.com (Rich Trouton) Organization: http://groups.google.com/ Newsgroups: soc.history.what-if References: 1 , 2 coyu@aol.com (Coyu) wrote in message news:<20010901182213.02116.00006930@ng-bd1.aol.com>... > John A. Lee wrote: > > >> Um. There are a lot of problems with Mitrokhin's book (actually > >> much more Christopher Andrew's). I wouldn't assert anything > >> from it without some other piece of confirmatory material. > > > > > >A trifle unfair, I think, especially when your later post indicates > >that your objection appears not to be based on any specific factual > >grounds. > > When I first read it, there were a number of items that raised, um, red > flags in my mind -- this resulted me in not buying the book, so I don't > have a ready list of what I found off. > > Much of it, though, struck me as very massaged data. Mitrokhin's > scraps, processed by the MI folks, given to Andrew in digest form, > then filled in with info from Andrew's earlier books. > > There was one dodgy assertion I remember specifically -- the rumors > about J. Edgar Hoover's homosexuality were said to be a KGB > tactic. Um. In actuality, they seem to have been around since Hoover > brought Clyde Tolson to the FBI, in the late twenties. I've found the passage to which you are referring (it's on pages 234-236 for those who are interested) and it refers to a Service A disinformation campaign against the FBI in general and Hoover in particular. I'm reproducing the passage to clarify the issue ("The Sword and Shield, page 235) "A third line of attack deployed by Service A against Hoover was to accuse him of being a homosexual. The truth about Hoover's probably severely repressed sexuality is unlikely ever to be known. Later much-publicized claims that he was a gay cross-dresser whose wardrobe included a red dress and boa which made him look like 'an old flapper,' and a black dress, 'very fluffy, with flounces and lace stockings,' which he wore with a black curly wig, rests on little more than the discredited testimony of a convicted perjurer, Susan Rosenstiel, who claimed to have seen Hoover so attired. Nor is there any reliable evidence that Hoover and his deputy, Clyde Tolson, who shared his house, ever had a homosexual relationship." It also goes on to say that Hoover didn't have any known female liasons, and includes a statement from his number three man, "Deke" DeLoach, that the only person that Hoover had ever probably loved was his mother. So the falsehoods that Service A were plausible, but then they went and screwed it up by sending "..anonymous letters, intended to appear to come from the Ku Klux Klan, to the editors of leading newspapers, accusing Hoover of personally selecting for promotion in the FBI homosexuals from whom he expected sexual favors. Not content with turning the FBI into 'a den of faggots,' Hoover had also allegedly been engaged for several decades in a larger gay conspiracy to staff the CIA and State Department with homosexuals. The national security of the United States, claimed the letters, was now seriously at risk. Service A's belief that major newspapers would take seriously nonsense of this kind, especially emanating from the Ku Klux Klan, was graphic evidence of the limitations in its understanding of American society. The letters had, predictably, no observable effect." ("The Sword and Shield", page 236) Rich Subject: Re: Hammer and Sickle Date: Wed, 29 Aug 2001 20:57:55 +0200 From: Radovan Garabik Newsgroups: soc.history.what-if References: 1 , 2 Adamanteus wrote: : "Ross Hopkins" wrote in message news:<3b8c0b38_1@mk-nntp-1.news.uk.worldonline.com>... :> What if, from the sixties onwards, the Cold War started turning Moscow's :> way? : ... :> :> What if, in short, the Soviets won the Cold War? :> :> All comments welcome. : It's nearly impossible. Communism is bound to end in economic failure : eventually. Even if the US doesn't practice containment, the USSR's : collapse is simply delayed by another 5-10 years. Depends on what you mean by communism. If the economic system, then you are probably right (though, it was not _that_ bad and managed to change old agrarian only Russia to word leading industrial superpower) If the political system, then (without a good sizeable sample of alternative histories) we can say nothing about it. I imagine that if somewhere in the 1960s the USSR introduced Prague-spring-like economic reforms, its economy could have catched on and we would have USSR still very viable and living by today - people do not overthrow totalitarian regimes if they are living comfortable lives. -- ----------------------------------------------------------- | Radovan Garabik http://melkor.dnp.fmph.uniba.sk/~garabik | | __..--^^^--..__ garabik @ fmph . uniba . sk | ----------------------------------------------------------- Antivirus alert: file .signature infected by signature virus. Hi! I'm a signature virus! Copy me into your signature file to help me spread! Subject: Re: Hammer and Sickle Date: 30 Aug 2001 17:25:02 -0700 From: korkhova@umdnj.edu (Adamanteus) Organization: http://groups.google.com/ Newsgroups: soc.history.what-if References: 1 , 2 , 3 Radovan Garabik wrote in message news:... > Adamanteus wrote: > : "Ross Hopkins" wrote in message news:<3b8c0b38_1@mk-nntp-1.news.uk.worldonline.com>... > :> What if, from the sixties onwards, the Cold War started turning Moscow's > :> way? > > : ... > > :> > :> What if, in short, the Soviets won the Cold War? > :> > :> All comments welcome. > > : It's nearly impossible. Communism is bound to end in economic failure > : eventually. Even if the US doesn't practice containment, the USSR's > : collapse is simply delayed by another 5-10 years. > > Depends on what you mean by communism. If the economic system, then > you are probably right (though, it was not _that_ bad and managed to > change old agrarian only Russia to word leading industrial superpower) You can thank Stalin's 5-year plans for that, which have more to do with strong-arming the economy than the sharing of wealth among the people. > If the political system, then (without a good sizeable sample of alternative > histories) we can say nothing about it. > I imagine that if somewhere in the 1960s the USSR introduced > Prague-spring-like economic reforms, its economy could have catched on and > we would have USSR still very viable and living by today - people do > not overthrow totalitarian regimes if they are living comfortable lives. True, but then that system would be unrecognizable as communism. Gorbachev tried this brand of reform in the 1980's and it failed. IMO, it failed because it wasn't done properly. Gorbachev wanted his cake and to eat it too. He wanted communism with capitalist institutions, but could never resolve which institutions he wanted turned free-market and how much. Furthermore, he was battling extremists on both sides for compromise which was few and far between. Subject: Re: Hammer and Sickle Date: Thu, 30 Aug 2001 13:27:20 +0000 (UTC) From: kenney@cix.compulink.co.uk Organization: Nextra UK Newsgroups: soc.history.what-if References: 1 In article , spam@melkor.dnp.fmph.uniba.sk (Radovan Garabik) wrote: > (though, it was not _that_ bad and managed to > change old agrarian only Russia to word leading industrial > superpower) Mainly because even inefficient use of untouched resources will greatly increase economic prosperity. When the USSR ran out of new sites of raw materials to exploit was when the system started to bite. Ken Young kenney@cix.co.uk Maternity is a matter of fact Paternity is a matter of opinion Subject: Re: Hammer and Sickle Date: Wed, 29 Aug 2001 21:53:52 +0100 From: Pete Barrett Organization: A Beeb User Newsgroups: soc.history.what-if References: 1 On Tue, 28 Aug 2001 22:22:57 +0100, "Ross Hopkins" wrote: >What if, from the sixties onwards, the Cold War started turning Moscow's >way? > >What if France turned outrightly hostile towards the US, declared it public >enemy number one, almost declare war on it, and split the free world down >the middle, while China and Russia remained no more than mildly annoyed with >each other? > >What if Russia got involved in a major police action abroad in the sixties >and seventies that it had to pull out of, pushing perilously close to civil >unrest along the way, along with major crises within it's leadership, only >emerging with lessons learnt and a considerably redone leadership that could >stand plenty of scrutiny? > I fear this may be very nearly ASB territory. Brezhnev had a prgamatic streak in him, but the idea of him learning this sort of lesson seems unlikely - much more probable that he'd *increase* secrecy. Of course, if we can somehow take Brezhnev out of the equation and replace him with a Gorbachev-like figure (Gorbachev himself is probably too young) as Khrushchev's successor (I'm not familiar enough with Soviet politics to suggest a name - Bulganin is the same generation as Khrushchev), then things might work out like that. >What if, from the seventies, the West started sliding into permanent >recession resulting from inherent problems in the capitalist system and an >increasingly corrupt leadership, while the Soviets were staging something >approximating a recovery? > This is rather more likely, I feel. Without suggesting that the capitalist system has any more inherent problems than any other, there were definitely economic problems in the 70s. If the oil screw is turned even more, and perhaps not released until well into the 80s, then a ten year recession is definitely on the cards. When recovery does come, the USSR could be in a position of dominance. Nevertheless, this is a second POD, not a consequence of the earlier one. >What if, in the eighties, a President emerged determined to reverse these >problems while a hardliner emerged in the Soviet Union taking several >reforms and increasing funding for Marxist revolutions around the world? > >What if, starting from 1989, American forces adopted a Sinatra doctrine and >pulled out of their bases around the world, opening them up to Soviet >influence? > >What if, in 1991, McCarthyite hardliners tried to remove the reformist >President in a coup, only to go up against a popular socialist alcoholic and >the American people, resulting in the disintegration of the US and their >conversion to Communist states? > >What if, in short, the Soviets won the Cold War? > For the Soviets to win the Cold War, the Soviet system has to look attractive to people. If you've got nothing, then communism, however harsh, looks attractive; but it looks considerably less attractive to people who are used to affluence (such as Europeans). A liberalised Soviet Union, with a significant production of consumer goods might do so, but how far back do we have to go to get that? Pete Barrett Subject: Re: Hammer and Sickle Date: 30 Aug 2001 18:50:15 -0700 From: korkhova@umdnj.edu (Adamanteus) Organization: http://groups.google.com/ Newsgroups: soc.history.what-if References: 1 , 2 Pete Barrett wrote in message news:... > For the Soviets to win the Cold War, the Soviet system has to look > attractive to people. If you've got nothing, then communism, however > harsh, looks attractive; but it looks considerably less attractive to > people who are used to affluence (such as Europeans). A liberalised > Soviet Union, with a significant production of consumer goods might do > so, but how far back do we have to go to get that? Here's a WI: Lenin's warning letter about Stalin is circulated in the party (in OTL, Stalin had it suppressed) and Stalin never becomes the Soviet communist party chairman. Instead, the other favorite, Trotsky, comes into power and continues Lenin's NEP (New Economic Policy). The economic recovery that began in 1922, after the Russian civil war, continues as in OTL, although the nature is different. There aren't, for example, the collective farms. Without Stalin's paranoia, the USSR becomes both politically and economically more attractive in the 1920's to the West. Disaster strikes in the 1930's when the Great Depression hits, and the entirety of the economy of the Soviets is forced to be nationalized. WW2 goes differently. Trotsky strikes no deals with Hitler, and builds up the military expecting a conflict. When war breaks out, Hitler first captures France, then goes after both Britain and Eastern Europe simultaneously. The war in Europe otherwise goes the same, except the USSR is not as devastated because it is better prepared. With less suspicion of Soviet motive, there's more friendliness between the big 3. Trotsky may even allow a US presence in Vladivostok to facilitate the war with Japan, ending the Pacific War a bit earlier. After the war, there's no Cold War. The USSR and USA enjoy a fantastic economic recovery. Trotsky uses NEP-like initiatives to rebuild the infrastructure destroyed during the war. The post-war world is a romantic mix of capitalism and socialism, in both the West and the East. In this alternate world, communism doesn't have the discredited and underhanded reputation it does in our world, so even the west can feel comfortable in its experimentation. Subject: Re: Hammer and Sickle Date: Fri, 31 Aug 2001 03:38:32 GMT From: "Rex F. May" Organization: Peak to Peak Internet (peakpeak.com) Newsgroups: soc.history.what-if References: 1 , 2 , 3 A few more useful idiots in the West could have let them win it, especially in the US. Imagine Presidents like Henry Wallace, Adlai Stevenson, Tom Harkin.... -- Rex F. May To order my book, click on: http://www.kiva.net/~jonabook/gdummy.htm See my cartoons daily at: http://www.cnsnews.com/cartoon/baloo.asp Subject: Re: Hammer and Sickle Date: 31 Aug 2001 04:54:42 GMT From: cassiusmaxim@aol.com (Emperor) Organization: AOL http://www.aol.com Newsgroups: soc.history.what-if References: 1 >A few more useful idiots in the West could have let >them win it, especially in the US. Imagine Presidents >like Henry Wallace, Adlai Stevenson, Tom Harkin.... > >-- What's wrong with Harki--oh wait! You're Rex F. May! My bad for trying to ask a bipartisan question of you. Subject: Re: Hammer and Sickle Date: 31 Aug 2001 05:04:14 GMT From: congyoglas@aol.comgentboss (President Chester A. Arthur) Organization: AOL http://www.aol.com Newsgroups: soc.history.what-if References: 1 >Subject: Re: Hammer and Sickle >From: cassiusmaxim@aol.com (Emperor) >Date: 8/31/2001 12:54 AM Eastern Daylight Time >Message-id: <20010831005442.18834.00003726@mb-fa.aol.com> > >>A few more useful idiots in the West could have let >>them win it, especially in the US. Imagine Presidents >>like Henry Wallace, Adlai Stevenson, Tom Harkin.... >> >>-- > >What's wrong with Harki--oh wait! You're >Rex F. May! > And you know, he's been Rex F. May for some time. The dastard! Well, I'll sort of slip this under the BoP radar; Stevenson was a lot more conservative than most people think. President Chester A. Arthur, the anti-Rutherford Hayes Subject: Re: Hammer and Sickle Date: Fri, 31 Aug 2001 06:15:59 GMT From: dtenner@ameritech.net (David Tenner) Organization: Prodigy Internet http://www.prodigy.com Newsgroups: soc.history.what-if References: 1 , 2 President Chester A. Arthur wrote in <20010831010414.06490.00008008@mb-fc.aol.com>: > >Well, I'll sort of slip this under the BoP radar; Stevenson was a lot more >conservative than most people think. On economic issues, he was certainly to the right of Truman, and in 1956 he was notably moderate on civil rights in an attempt to win back white Southerners who had voted for Ike in 1952. (Harriman was the civil rights firebrand in 1956.) On foreign policy, though, he *was* a little bit dovish by the standards of the 1950's. -- David Tenner dtenner@ameritech.net Subject: Re: Hammer and Sickle Date: Fri, 31 Aug 2001 12:29:09 +0100 From: "Ross Hopkins" Newsgroups: soc.history.what-if References: 1 , 2 , 3 "Adamanteus" wrote in message news:c3d22f5f.0108301750.1bf8aed1@posting.google.com... > Pete Barrett wrote in message news:... > > For the Soviets to win the Cold War, the Soviet system has to look > > attractive to people. If you've got nothing, then communism, however > > harsh, looks attractive; but it looks considerably less attractive to > > people who are used to affluence (such as Europeans). A liberalised > > Soviet Union, with a significant production of consumer goods might do > > so, but how far back do we have to go to get that? > > Here's a WI: > > Lenin's warning letter about Stalin is circulated in the party (in > OTL, Stalin had it suppressed) and Stalin never becomes the Soviet > communist party chairman. Instead, the other favorite, Trotsky, comes > into power and continues Lenin's NEP (New Economic Policy). The > economic recovery that began in 1922, after the Russian civil war, > continues as in OTL, although the nature is different. There aren't, > for example, the collective farms. > > Without Stalin's paranoia, the USSR becomes both politically and > economically more attractive in the 1920's to the West. Disaster > strikes in the 1930's when the Great Depression hits, and the entirety > of the economy of the Soviets is forced to be nationalized. > > WW2 goes differently. Trotsky strikes no deals with Hitler, and > builds up the military expecting a conflict. When war breaks out, > Hitler first captures France, then goes after both Britain and Eastern > Europe simultaneously. The war in Europe otherwise goes the same, > except the USSR is not as devastated because it is better prepared. > With less suspicion of Soviet motive, there's more friendliness > between the big 3. Trotsky may even allow a US presence in > Vladivostok to facilitate the war with Japan, ending the Pacific War a > bit earlier. > > After the war, there's no Cold War. The USSR and USA enjoy a > fantastic economic recovery. Trotsky uses NEP-like initiatives to > rebuild the infrastructure destroyed during the war. > > The post-war world is a romantic mix of capitalism and socialism, in > both the West and the East. In this alternate world, communism > doesn't have the discredited and underhanded reputation it does in our > world, so even the west can feel comfortable in its experimentation. Mind you, there always was, is, and ever will be an almost irrational fear of Communism in the inner circles of most Western countries. The best-case scenario you described would probably never come about, since there are just too many politicians exclaiming that Communism is the source of all evil in the modern world. There is also the small matter of Trotsky. He wasn't the Western-friendly pragmatist you seem to make him out as. One of the many myriad reasons for his downfall was his sheer arrogance, his belief that he was destined to be leader of the Soviet Union that blinded him to the deals Stalin was making behind his back, turning his arrogance against him, until it was too late. Also, Trotsky's main belief was in the principle of permanent revolution. That is, as soon as a system, no matter how radical, is institutionalised, it must be overthrown. This, as any mere mind would tell you, is dumb, but Trotsky had fallen into that parodoxical trap whereby he was such a genius that he had turned terminally stupid. His head was in the clouds. As well as that, Trotsky was an ardent supporter of transporting revolution to other countries, so a Trotsky-led Soviet Union might have embarked on a general invasion of Western Europe, perhaps around the time of the '29 crash to capitalise on what he would see as Western weakness. That attempt would most probably fail spectacularly. That's the thing to note about Stalin. He may have been a paranoid, schizophrenic psychopath who to all intents and purposes was worse than Hitler, but he was at least an extremely cunning pragmatist, which perhaps made him infinitely more dangerous than Hitler. He may not have recognised it himself but his behaviour suggests that he believed that Russia was a great power in the same way America or Britain or Germany was, not some kind of international example to follow and discuss in lecture halls. So he treated it as such, he built up spheres of influence, identified a power it could be safely anti to in order to gain sympathies, and used the Soviet Union's ideology as no more than a useful bargaining tool against his enemies. Hitler, on the other hand, was just a raving bigot. Subject: Re: Hammer and Sickle Date: 31 Aug 2001 12:42:13 GMT From: cgrussel@bradford.ac.uk (CG RUSSELL) Newsgroups: soc.history.what-if References: 1 , 2 , 3 Adamanteus (korkhova@umdnj.edu) wrote: : Pete Barrett wrote in message news:... : > For the Soviets to win the Cold War, the Soviet system has to look : > attractive to people. If you've got nothing, then communism, however : > harsh, looks attractive; but it looks considerably less attractive to : > people who are used to affluence (such as Europeans). A liberalised : > Soviet Union, with a significant production of consumer goods might do : > so, but how far back do we have to go to get that? If the absence of a pan-European revolution following on is a given then you need to go as far as the revolution itself. The Bolsheviks were the only party represented in the Soviet to be in favour of the revolution. Had they the support of the majority of the parties, not necessarily other marxists like the Mensheviks but those representing the peasantry, the Narodniks say, then they might have had a goer. It would have been harder for the Whites to organise an army of their own after the collapse of the Czarist army if the peasantry were reasonably united under a few political representatives. Russia's old, old problem though - the peasantry were never anything like united in common cause and with the communications of the time they were never going to be. Why is this important? See my take on NEP below. : Here's a WI: : Lenin's warning letter about Stalin is circulated in the party (in : OTL, Stalin had it suppressed). Lenin's Testament was read before a full sitting of the Central Comittee. They all, Trotsky included, voted to ignore it. They then all, Trotsky included, signed a letter to the delegates of the 10th Party Conference with the effect that the last ramblings of Lenin should be treated with the respect due to the vanguard of the proletariat but should be acknowledged as the last ramblings of a dying man. It looks damning of Stalin to us because of our perspective and knowledge of what is to follow. Each and every member of the CC that was sat around that table was criticised harshly by it though it is certainly true that Stalin came off worse from it. The other potentials were really only Kamanev, Zinoviev, Trotsky and, for the compulsive gambler who simply has to have the big odds, Bukharin. Bukharin was supposed to be too bookish without fully understanding what he was doing, i.e dangerously flittish (biggest advocate of War Communism turned into biggest advocate of NEP so Lenin did have a point). Trotsky was supposed to be too keen on the administrative side of things, i.e. devious, plays his hand through the state now in power rather than through the pen when a revolutionary. Kamanev and Zinoviev were not to be blamed for their failure to vote in favour of the revolution back in October '17, i.e cast your minds back to 1917 and remember how these two behaved. They all had an interest in surpressing that document, it was only in exile and even then I think only under the Dewey Commision that Trotsky started to talk. : and Stalin never becomes the Soviet : communist party chairman. Instead, the other favorite, Trotsky, comes : into power and continues Lenin's NEP (New Economic Policy). The : economic recovery that began in 1922, after the Russian civil war, : continues as in OTL, although the nature is different. There aren't, : for example, the collective farms. The nature is very different. He proposed something similar to NEP a couple of years before NEP became reality but when it actually came to implementing it he was dead set against. NEP wasn't about economic reform. Well, it was, but not the kind of economic reform to bring benefit to all and provide the status quo with just that little bit more status. When pan-European revolution didn't follow and the 'advanced' proletariat disappear into the red army suddenly there is a glut of agricultural produce in comparison to the industrial goods needed to pay for it. The purpose was to stratify the peasantry more obviously into rich and poor with the ultimate aim of the poor overthrowing the rich. At that point the 'land' part of 'Peace, Land and Bread' is fulfilled and the long promise to rid the land of Kulaks (the rich peasants) would come into being. In the end what happened was the agricultural prices go up, industrial prices fall and the stand off that all Russian marxists have spent their entire lives trying to figure out how to avoid is becoming material reality. It's not much town v lots and lots of country and, with the distribution of forces such as they are, the smart bets are on the country winning. The allocated time ran out however and forced collectivisation with it's industrialised division of labour methods follows neatly behind. Huge numbers of unemployed and starving plus huge amounts of capital from sale of grain overseas equals first Five Year Plan. Apologies for labouring the point, but I'm trying to demonstrate that at no point is NEP about solving the problems introduced by War Communism with the potential of consumer goods and other riches to follow. NEP is about preparing the ground for industrialisation. It didn't work out the way they wanted it to but it did still provide the opportunities for how they ended up doing it. Cheers, Chris. -- Chris | Russell's | Five | Bradford, Bradford, (so good I said it twice) Line | Sig | Subject: Re: Hammer and Sickle Date: Fri, 31 Aug 2001 14:05:48 GMT From: mbusse@midway.uchicago.edu (Marty Busse) Organization: Com Ed Bites like a Great White Shark Newsgroups: soc.history.what-if References: 1 , 2 , 3 In article , Adamanteus wrote: >Pete Barrett wrote in message >news:... >> For the Soviets to win the Cold War, the Soviet system has to look >> attractive to people. If you've got nothing, then communism, however >> harsh, looks attractive; but it looks considerably less attractive to >> people who are used to affluence (such as Europeans). A liberalised >> Soviet Union, with a significant production of consumer goods might do >> so, but how far back do we have to go to get that? > >Here's a WI: > >Lenin's warning letter about Stalin is circulated in the party (in >OTL, Stalin had it suppressed) This is mythology. Lenin's letter ripped on pretty much *all* of the party leadership, although Stalin caught it pretty hard becasue of an incident between Krupskaya (Lenin's wife) and Stalin...an incident where Stalin had been sent by the rest of the party leadership to do their dirty work in trying to get the ailing Lenin to relax a little. The relevant documents are at: http://home.mira.net/~andy/bs/1922vil.htm This myth is largely the work of Trotsky's partisans in the international Marxist movement. > and Stalin never becomes the Soviet >communist party chairman. Instead, the other favorite, Trotsky, comes >into power and continues Lenin's NEP (New Economic Policy). Trotsky was no one's favorite to lead but his own. (The other members of the party leadership strongly disliked his prima donna ways, and were suspicious of Trosky succumbing to 'bonapartism.') He was also publically making statements about 'what is to be done' with the Soviet economy that were not too different from what Stalin put into practice. (And Trotsky was no slouch at piling up the corpses when he wanted to.) Stalin was, during his consolidation of power, one of the moderates on economic issues. > The >economic recovery that began in 1922, after the Russian civil war, >continues as in OTL, although the nature is different. There aren't, >for example, the collective farms. > Why would collectivefarms not appear? I strongly suggest you look at some of Trotsky's statements during the '20s. >Without Stalin's paranoia, the USSR becomes both politically and >economically more attractive in the 1920's to the West. With Trotsky, the arch-firebrand of the Bolsheviks, in charge? > Disaster >strikes in the 1930's when the Great Depression hits, and the entirety >of the economy of the Soviets is forced to be nationalized. > >WW2 goes differently. Trotsky strikes no deals with Hitler, Once again, I have to protest. There is nothing to suggest that Trotsky wouldn't strike a deal with Hitler if he thought it would aid the cause of communism. (snip) > >After the war, there's no Cold War. The USSR and USA enjoy a >fantastic economic recovery. Trotsky uses NEP-like initiatives to >rebuild the infrastructure destroyed during the war. > >The post-war world is a romantic mix of capitalism and socialism, in >both the West and the East. In this alternate world, communism >doesn't have the discredited and underhanded reputation it does in our >world, so even the west can feel comfortable in its experimentation. This isn't just an alternate world: it's an alternate Trotsky, one without the tendencies to mass-slaughter, extreme commuinist policies, and tyranny that our version displayed while he was in power. I strongly suggest you drop the copy of Isaac Deutscher's works you've apparently been reading and pick up Volkagonov's biography of the man. Trotsky looks like a saint only if you compare the powerless exile Trotsky to Stalin at his worst. If you compare Trotsky in power with Stalin, the main difference is that Trotsky was less willing to murder fellow party members...unless, of course, they were against the party line, like all those fellows he dispatched into some dank circle of hell during the Kronstadt rebellion. -- Cum catapultae proscriptae erunt tum soli proscript catapultas habebunt. Subject: Re: Hammer and Sickle Date: 31 Aug 2001 17:04:43 GMT From: cgrussel@bradford.ac.uk (CG RUSSELL) Newsgroups: soc.history.what-if References: 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 Marty Busse (mbusse@midway.uchicago.edu) wrote: : In article , : Adamanteus wrote: : >Pete Barrett wrote in message : >news:... : >> For the Soviets to win the Cold War, the Soviet system has to look : >> attractive to people. If you've got nothing, then communism, however : >> harsh, looks attractive; but it looks considerably less attractive to : >> people who are used to affluence (such as Europeans). A liberalised : >> Soviet Union, with a significant production of consumer goods might do : >> so, but how far back do we have to go to get that? : > : >Here's a WI: : > : >Lenin's warning letter about Stalin is circulated in the party (in : >OTL, Stalin had it suppressed) : This is mythology. Lenin's letter ripped on pretty much *all* of the : party leadership, although Stalin caught it pretty hard becasue of an : incident between Krupskaya (Lenin's wife) and Stalin...an incident : where Stalin had been sent by the rest of the party leadership to do : their dirty work in trying to get the ailing Lenin to relax a little. : The relevant documents are at: : http://home.mira.net/~andy/bs/1922vil.htm : This myth is largely the work of Trotsky's partisans in the : international Marxist movement. There is a reply to the last letter (dated March 5th, '23) from Stalin that Andy hasn't included in his book. I don't remember the exact text but it has often been used by various Trots in the past to seek to further damage Stalin's reputation (reputation as a good Bolshevik that is). It's not ground-breaking exactly, it's more along the lines of "How am I to blame for this?" I have it in a book at home which I shall try and remember to post later. -- Chris | Russell's | Five | Bradford, Bradford, (so good I said it twice) Line | Sig | Subject: Re: Hammer and Sickle Date: Sat, 01 Sep 2001 14:58:46 GMT From: vontrippenhof@hotmailthemick.com (Chris Williams) Organization: BT Internet Newsgroups: soc.history.what-if References: 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 On Fri, 31 Aug 2001 14:05:48 GMT, mbusse@midway.uchicago.edu (Marty Busse) wrote: >I strongly suggest you drop the copy of Isaac Deutscher's works you've >apparently been reading and pick up Volkagonov's biography of the >man. Just like Deutscher, Volkoganov had an axe to grind. Still, Trotsky was just as bad as Stalin. He had the correct position on WW1, though, so he wasn't all bad. >If you compare Trotsky in power >with Stalin, the main difference is that Trotsky was less willing to >murder fellow party members...unless, of course, they were against the >party line, like all those fellows he dispatched into some dank circle >of hell during the Kronstadt rebellion. 'Sright - not that good materialists like Lev, me and the Kronstadt sailors think that hell exists. The real problem is that in conditions prevailing in Russia in 1890-1917, how do you avoid a generation of Marxists appearing who have a mystical belief in the vaguard party, because that's the only thing that looks like it might work? In a world of secret police, repression, and the slaughter of millions, the self-organisation of the working class is very difficult: the reliance on the party is far easier on a day-to-day and a straegic level. Industrialisation has never been pretty, even for countries blessed with massive material, institutional, and contingent advantages. I can't see how any 'nice Bolsheviks' can get or stay in power, starting from any POD after August 1914. Chris Subject: Re: Hammer and Sickle Date: Mon, 03 Sep 2001 12:52:46 GMT From: mbusse@midway.uchicago.edu (Marty Busse) Organization: Com Ed Bites like a Great White Shark Newsgroups: soc.history.what-if References: 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 In article <3b90f5b8.3338285@news.btinternet.com>, Chris Williams wrote: >On Fri, 31 Aug 2001 14:05:48 GMT, mbusse@midway.uchicago.edu (Marty >Busse) wrote: > >>I strongly suggest you drop the copy of Isaac Deutscher's works you've >>apparently been reading and pick up Volkagonov's biography of the >>man. > >Just like Deutscher, Volkoganov had an axe to grind. Unlike Deutscher, he had access to the archives. And considering the panegyrics that float around to this day about Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin, I think his axe was well worth grinding. >Still, Trotsky >was just as bad as Stalin. He had the correct position on WW1, though, >so he wasn't all bad. > Pulmonary plague isn't as bad as the ebola virus, but I'd still prefer not to be infected by either one. >>If you compare Trotsky in power >>with Stalin, the main difference is that Trotsky was less willing to >>murder fellow party members...unless, of course, they were against the >>party line, like all those fellows he dispatched into some dank circle >>of hell during the Kronstadt rebellion. > >'Sright - not that good materialists like Lev, me and the Kronstadt >sailors think that hell exists. > Maybe "turned into ex-parrots during the Kronstadt rebellion" would be a better phrase. >The real problem is that in conditions prevailing in Russia in >1890-1917, how do you avoid a generation of Marxists appearing who >have a mystical belief in the vaguard party, because that's the only >thing that looks like it might work? In a world of secret police, >repression, and the slaughter of millions, the self-organisation of >the working class is very difficult: the reliance on the party is far >easier on a day-to-day and a straegic level. > >Industrialisation has never been pretty, even for countries blessed >with massive material, institutional, and contingent advantages. I >can't see how any 'nice Bolsheviks' can get or stay in power, >starting from any POD after August 1914. > You're taking away a lot of the responsiblity for the mind-numbing crimes of the Bolsheviks from them and assigning it to vague historical forces. You're also using an interesting oxymoron, since even "nice" Bolsheviks like Trotsky and Bukharin were blood-soaked tyrannical butchers. Let's say there was no military coup to put the Bolsheviks in power: things remain as they were, with a vague coalition of socialist parties in power...but not the Boslheviks. I can't think of a way to avoid a bloody civil war, but the post-war period doesn't have to be such a bloody and repressive mess. That it was such is largely the work of people who were bloody and repressive minded. Subject: Re: Hammer and Sickle Date: Mon, 03 Sep 2001 20:06:39 GMT From: vontrippenhof@hotmailthemick.com (Chris Williams) Organization: BT Internet Newsgroups: soc.history.what-if References: 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 On Mon, 03 Sep 2001 12:52:46 GMT, mbusse@midway.uchicago.edu (Marty Busse) wrote: >>Still, Trotsky >>was just as bad as Stalin. He had the correct position on WW1, though, >>so he wasn't all bad. >Pulmonary plague isn't as bad as the ebola virus, but I'd still >prefer not to be infected by either one. Maybe not, but I tend to have a sneaking sympathy with the people who tried to stop that evil conflict by any means necessary, even though their massive gamble failed to come off, and the results were as bad as they themselves had predicted. >>The real problem is that in conditions prevailing in Russia in >>1890-1917, how do you avoid a generation of Marxists appearing who >>have a mystical belief in the vaguard party, because that's the only >>thing that looks like it might work? In a world of secret police, >>repression, and the slaughter of millions, the self-organisation of >>the working class is very difficult: the reliance on the party is far >>easier on a day-to-day and a straegic level. >> >>Industrialisation has never been pretty, even for countries blessed >>with massive material, institutional, and contingent advantages. I >>can't see how any 'nice Bolsheviks' can get or stay in power, >>starting from any POD after August 1914. >> > >You're taking away a lot of the responsiblity for the mind-numbing >crimes of the Bolsheviks from them and assigning it to vague >historical forces. You're also using an interesting oxymoron, since >even "nice" Bolsheviks like Trotsky and Bukharin were blood-soaked >tyrannical butchers. Spot the quote marks. I was criticising the premises of the original POD - I'm not sure that a non-repressive CPSU could ever come into existence, or it it did, it would be a very different animal. >Let's say there was no military coup to put the Bolsheviks in power: >things remain as they were, with a vague coalition of socialist >parties in power...but not the Boslheviks. I can't think of a way to >avoid a bloody civil war, but the post-war period doesn't have to be >such a bloody and repressive mess. That it was such is largely the >work of people who were bloody and repressive minded. Yes. However, I'm not sure that a 'vague coalition' will win the civil war. And the victors might end up being as nasty as the Bolsheviks in the short term, though I imagine they'd not be up for the planned famine and the Yezhovchina. Chris